Freedom of Speech and Press in America, by Edward G. Hudson by Fuchs, Ralph F
Indiana Law Journal
Volume 39 | Issue 3 Article 10
Spring 1964
Freedom of Speech and Press in America, by
Edward G. Hudson
Ralph F. Fuchs
Indiana University School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the Communications Law Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, and the First
Amendment Commons
This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Law
School Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Indiana Law Journal by an authorized editor of Digital
Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
Fuchs, Ralph F. (1964) "Freedom of Speech and Press in America, by Edward G. Hudson," Indiana Law Journal: Vol. 39 : Iss. 3 , Article
10.
Available at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol39/iss3/10
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
people will continue to sanction this assertion of power and responsibility
by the Court remains to be seen. It is a scant thirty years since the Su-
preme Court came under heavy attack in the 1930's, an attack which re-
sulted in a changed judicial outlook, a new willingness to accept regula-
tory power of the federal government. And perhaps it is unrealistic to
assume that the Court can long protect minority rights if the dominant
majority through fear or impatience demands that they shall have their
way. But at least the Court compels the community to have a sober,
second thought. And ideals and values announced by the Court may
eventually find sufficient acceptance to counterbalance the tendency of
the politically powerful to ignore the just claims of the weak.
WILLIAM M. BEANEYt
FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN AMERICA. By Edward G. Hu-
don. Washington: Public Affairs Press. 1963. Pp. xiv, 224. $4.50.
In his highly readable' volume containing just 179 pages of text,
Mr. Hudon does an excellent job of tracing the theories which through
history have underlain the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United
States interpreting the free speech and press provisions of the First
Amenidment to the Federal Constitution. The book neither attempts to
discuss the cases in detail nor to praise or condemn, except quite incident-
ally. Its primary purpose is to discover whether any of the tests of consti-
tutional validity that successively have prevailed in the Court has been
more successful than the others, and whether the Court has now arrived
at a stable basis of decision.
The answer to both of the foregoing questions is in the negative,
but the author concludes with a suggested constitutional test based on the
specific beliefs of the fathers of the country, which he thinks may pro-
vide a sound basis for decision. His suggestion is closely allied to the
views so eloquently set forth by Mr. Justice Black in several noteworthy
opinions during the past five years and in his 1960 James Madison lec-
ture at the New York University Law Center.2  The bibliography which
t Professor of Politics, Princeton University.
1. There are a number of typographical errors in the book, which better proof-
reading would have caught, and on page 83 the coined word "glimly" appears, perhaps
substituted for "dimly." On p. 126 the statute involved in Beauharnais v. Illinois,
343 U.S. 250 (1952), is misstated as one designed simply "to punish libel of an in-
dividual"; but in general the author's capsule summaries of cases are remarkably
clear and correct.
2. Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 865 (1960).
BOOK REVIEWS
accompanies each of the fourteen chapters, in addition to footnote cita-
tions, facilitates reference to other pertinent literature, including recent
books and articles, all of which has been taken into account by the author.
The first four chapters of Mr. Hudon's book discuss the common
law background of free speech principles and the conceptions of constitu-
tional freedom which prevailed on this side of the Atlantic prior to the
adoption of the Bill of Rights. The author finds that the English liber-
tarian objection to prior restraint on speech and press was enlarged in
this country to a body of natural law principles which postulated free-
dom from other forms of governmental restriction as well. This expan-
sion was, however, not given effect in the decisions of the Federal courts
under the Alien and Sedition Laws, which sanctioned criminal punish-
ment for utterances that could not have been prevented by law. The
result was that as late as 1907 the Court could assert in Patterson v. Colo-
rado,' through Mr. Justice Holmes, that the free speech and press provi-
sions of the First Amendment "do not prevent the subsequent punish-
ment" of such publications "as may be deemed contrary to the public
welfare." Only in Near v. Minnesota 4 in 1931 and Grosjean v. American
Press Co.' in 1936 did the Court finally and clearly state through Chief
Justice Hughes and Mr. Justice Sutherland that the common law view
had been broadened in this country-specifically in the First Amendment,
now made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment
as well as to the Federal Government-so as to outlaw governmental in-
terference of various kinds with the constitutionally guaranteed freedoms.
In the period immediately following World War I, the theory that
the abuse of free speech might be punished, which built upon the common
law of seditious libel, was briefly dominant; but it yielded later to the
clear-and-present-danger theory which was initially advanced in 1919 by
Mr. Justice Holmes.' This theory was long in gaining ground, and it
was not until after a "decade of flux" in the 1930's that the Court in
Thornhill v. Alabama7 finally adhered to it by a clear majority. Vigorous
objections were afterward made to it by Mr. Justice Frankfurter.8 It
was supplemented in later cases by the "preferred position" which the
Court assigned to the First Amendment freedoms in constitutional ad-
judication;' but its dominance was brief. It was applied to attempted
3. 205 U.S. 454 (1907), cited p. 54.
4. 283 U.S. 697 (1931), cited p. 55.
5. 297 U.S. 233 (1936), cite p. 55.
6. The test is whether the exercise of freedom in each case is of such a nature
and takes place in such circumstances "as to create a clear and present danger" of
"substantive evils" which the legislature "has a right to prevent." P. 70.
7. 310 U.S. 88 (1940), cited pp. 87-88.
8. Pp. 107-08.
9. Pp. 87, 92-93, 102.
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punishment for contempt of court and to interference with public as-
semblies and labor organizing activities ;1" but in 1950, Dennis v. United
States" drastically altered its nature, and it has not since been made the
basis of decision.
Contending now for supremacy in the Court are the view taken by
Mr. Justice Black, joined most clearly by the Chief Justice and Mr. Jus-
tice Douglas, and the so-called "balancing" process 2 whereby the relative
social importance of the constitutional freedom asserted in a particular
situation and of the evil that is sought to be prevented by legal interfer-
ence with the freedom must be weighed against each other. The weak-
ness of "balancing" lies in its failure to supply any rule of decision. Like
the clear and present danger test, however, it could be supplemented (as
it has not been as yet) by the "preferred position" doctrine and by specific
rules of decision based on a judgment as to types of situations instead
of in each case separately, whereby, for example, prior restraint of writ-
ten or printed publications or punishment for political utterances might
be banned. If "balancing" were so supplemented, its outcome might not
be vastly different from the results of Mr. Justice Black's view, which
attempts to attach a precise over-all legal meaning to the words, "Con-
gress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press." In this view, "no law" is taken literally, but possible exceptions
to free speech or press, such as libel, obscenity, or incitement to crime,
are left to be defined.
It may be doubted whether the results in particular cases actually
have turned or will turn on a choice between the two tests as so far de-
veloped. A "balancing" by Mr. Justice Black as strongly supports con-
stitutional freedom in the individual instance as his conception of the
area in which "no law" suppressing freedom may be enacted. 3 His
brethren who favor "balancing," on the other hand, can differ as readily
with him concerning the line between libel or indecency and protected
speech, 4 or whether motion pictures are a form of speech or press
equally protected with other forms, 5 as they can over the weight of in-
10. Pp. 98-105.
11. 341 U.S. 494 (1950), cited pp. 111-22.
12. Pp. 122, 157-58. See Frantz, Is the First Amendment Law? A Reply to Pro-
fessor Mendelson, 51 CALiF. L. REv. 729 (1963), for a perceptive discussion of the
issue so raised.
13. Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959), dissenting opinion of Mr.
Justice Black; Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36 (1961), dissenting
opinion of Mr. Justice Black.
14. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952) ; Roth v. United States, 354 U.S.
476 (1957).
15. Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961). In Giboney v.
Empire Storage Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949), Mr. Justice Black wrote the opinion of a
unanimous Court sustaining a State's outlawry of peaceful picketing in the course of an
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terests on each end of the balancing beam. Mr. Hudon suggests that the
"natural law" of freedom as the fathers of the country saw it, which
extended to some matters of detail, may supply answers to a good many
questions."
Surely the views of the fathers are important in reaching conclu-
sions; but as Mr. Justice Brennan has pointed out with reference to the
establishment of religion clause, the preservation of inherited values un-
der changed conditions is more fundamental than adherence to specific
early views, even when these can be ascertained. 7 There are, moreover,
many matters, such as the limits of political activity and free speech by
civil servants 8 and members of the armed forces of a modern state, or
censorship of so vivid and accessible a portrayal of conduct as the motion
picture,"0 which the fathers knew not of. Unless all "speech" by govern-
ment personnel must be wholly "free" or motion pictures are equated to
newspaper editorials, difficult choices of policy must be made by the
Supreme Court when governmental regulation of these forms of expres-
sion comes up for judgment.
Mr. Hudon does not consider the question, as yet inadequately dis-
cussed either on the Court or off, of whether the same method of deci-
sion or test of validity applies to judging the constitutionality of compul-
sion upon witnesses to answer questions in investigations as to determin-
ing whether a statute can stand. The most acute controversies with re-
spect to "balancing" and the alternative to it have arisen in cases involv-
ing investigations." If an inquiry or the requirement that witnesses
answer is a "law" and if inquiry into opinion, utterances, or association
is automatically foreclosed whenever resistance is encountered, or even
if inquiry is stopped whenever it appears that the required disclosure
might injure the reputation of the witness or of someone else, legislative
access to information is cut off without consideration of the possible
need for it, on the basis of a rule which was fashioned to meet quite
different situations. A "balancing" process of decision, supplemented by
unlawful but, in economic terms, arguably justifiable boycott; for "it has never been
deemed an abridgment of freedom of speech or press to make a course of conduct illegal
merely because the conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of
language, either spoken, written, or printed." Id. at 502.
16. Pp. 175-77. Mr. Hudon is careful to state that not all questions could thus
be answered; the advantage would be that a central area of freedom would be considered
completely inviolable, even though its boundaries might be in dispute.
17. School District of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963),
dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Brennan, at 234-42.
18. United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
19. Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 336 U.S. 490 (1949).
20. Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959); Konigsberg v. State Bar
of California, 366 U.S. 36 (1961); Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U.S. 399 (1961);
Braden v. United States, 365 U.S. 431 (1961).
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
specific rules such as might establish immunity of political or religious
affiliation or of educational discussion from compulsory disclosure,2
involves, on the other hand, the articulation of a basis of decision in terms
of the interests presently at stake.
The basic question is whether answers are to be mainly reached with-
in a framework of received but flexible principle or mainly found within
a body of law that is assumed to have been enacted with considerable pre-
cision. Neither approach can dispense with the need, in close cases, for
the Justices to bring their highest statesmanship to bear in reaching new
answers to new questions. The values to be applied are those inherited
from the founding of the Republic; but the maintenance of civil liberties
rests in the last analysis on the devotion of the Justices to them and on
their sensitivity to the requirements of maintaining them in a fast-
changing world. By illuminating the inheritance from the fathers with
such clarity as recorded history permits and tracing its fate during two
centuries of development, Mr. Hudon has aided the solution of many
problems that lie in the future. His book merits close reading.
RALPH F. FucHst
21. In Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, supra note 20, at 64, Mr. Justice
Black suggests that, at the least, the First Amendment free speech and press provision
should absolutely secure "the right of the people to discuss matters of religious or public
interest;" in Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957), at 261-66, Justices
Frankfurter and Harlan, who make the "balancing" approach, conclude that government
may not intrude into discussion in academic halls "except for reasons that are exigent
and obviously compelling" or invade the "political autonomy" of the citizen except
for reasons that are "compelling." See also Barenblatt v. United States, supra note 20,
at 129.
t Professor of Law, Indiana University.
